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A decade ago the scientific community was sounding alann bells about the impact 
of intellectual property on the ability of scientists to do their work. 1 Protracted 
negotiations over access to patented mice2 and genes,3 scientific databases,4 and 
tangible research materials5 all pointed toward the same conclusion: that intellec-
tual property claims were undennining traditional sharing norms to the detriment 
of science. Michael Heller and I highlighted one dimension of this concern: that too 
many intellectual property rights in 'upstream' research results could paradoxically 
restrict 'downstream' research and product development by making it too costly 
and burdensome to collect all the necessary licenses.6 
+ © 2009 Rebecca S. Eisenberg. I have previously published a more extensive analysis of the litera-
ture discussed in this paper at Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? 
Rethinking theAnticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUSTON L. REv. 1059 (2008). 
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law. I am grateful to workshop participants at the 
University of Michigan Law School, Harvard Business School, the W. Maurice Young Centre of 
Applied Ethics at the University of British Columbia, the University of Houston Law Center Institute 
for Intellectual Property and Information Law, and Bar Han University Faculty of Law for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
I See, eg, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (l 997); Report of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on 
Research Tools (1998), available at <http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm>; Donald 
Kennedy, Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 SCIENCE 2249 (200 I). 
2 Eliot Marshall, NIH, DuPont Declare Truce in Mouse War, 281 SCIENCE 1261 (1998); Eliot 
Marshall, DuPont Ups Ante on Use of Harvard's Oncomouse, 296 SCIENCE 1212 (2002); Sam Jaffe, 
Ongoing Battle over Transgenic Mice, THE SCIENTIST (July 19, 2004) at 46--47. 
3 Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush to Patent DNA, 275 SCIENCE 780 (1997); Michael Balter, 
Transatlantic War Over BRCAl Patent, 292 SCIENCE 1818 (2001 ). 
4 AAAS Resolution, Statement on Intellectual Property Protection for Databases ( 1997), available at 
<http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php?doc_id=446>. 
5 Eliot Marshall, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here, 278 SCIENCE 212 (1997). 
6 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). See also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent 
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Since that time numerous empirical studies have sought to measure the impact of 
intellectual property on research scientists, 7 and found fewer impediments to aca-
demic research than policymakers may have projected on the basis of early salient 
controversies. 8 Outside the field of genetic testing,9 most scientists report no 
difficulties in attempting to acquire IP-protected technologies, and only a small 
percentage report significant delays in research or having to abandon a project 
because ofIP. Even in fields characterized by extensive patenting, many academic 
researchers seem to be either oblivious to the patents they might be infringing or 
unconcerned about potential infringement liability. More significant to researchers 
than patents as such have been restrictions on access to materials and data, such as 
requirements for institutional assent to the terms of materials transfer agreements. 10 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 
119-50 (A. Jaffe & J. Lerner eds., 2000). 
7 See John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285-340 
(W. M. Cohen & S. Merrill eds. 2003) (hereinafter Walsh/ Arora/Cohen ~ffects); John P. Walsh, Ashish 
Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003); John P. 
Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen, & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual 
Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 1184 (2007) (hereinafter Walsh/ 
Cohen/Cho, Where Excludability Matters); John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley Cohen, View from 
the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005) (hereinafter View from the Bench); 
Wesley M. Cohen& John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in INNOVATION 
POLICY AND ECONOMICS 1-30 (8th ed. 2008) (hereinafter Cohen & Walsh, Real Impediments); OECD, 
GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES EVIDENCE AND 
POLICIES 45-49 (2002) (hereinafter OECD Genetic Inventions); Joseph Straus, Henrik Holzapfel & 
Matthias Lindenrneir, Genetic Inventions and Patent Law, An Empirical Survey of Selected German R 
& D Institutions (2004) (hereinafter Straus/Holzapfel/Lindenmeir); AAAS PROJECT ON SCIENCE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTHEPUBLIC INTEREST, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES: 
A REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES (2007), available at <http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_Four_Country_ 
Report.pdf> (hereinafter 'SIPP! Report'); Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical 
Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry (2003), available at 
<http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/BiotechReportFinal.pdf> (herein-
after Nicol & Nielsen). 
s See Timothy Caulfield, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, F. Scott Kieff & John P. Walsh, Evidence and 
Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY I 09 I 
(2006). 
9 The empirical record suggests that patents present greater obstacles to both research and clinical 
care in the DNA diagnostic field. See Mildred K. Cho, Samantha Illangasekare, Meredith A. Weaver, 
Debra G .B. Leonard, & Jon F. Merz, Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic 
Testing Services, 51. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3-8 (2003); Jon F. Merz, Antigone G. Kriss, Debra G.B. 
Leonard & Mildred Cho, Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577 (2002). For a description 
of problems in negotiating for patent licenses necessary to conduct particular genetic tests, see Sirpa 
Soini et al., Patenting and licensing in Genetic Testing: Ethical, Legal and Social Issues, 16 EUR. J. OF 
HUMAN GENETICS SI0, Sl5-Sl6 (2008). 
10 This finding is consistent with my own earlier observation, based on an investigation conducted for 
the NIH Working Group on Research Tools a decade ago, that low value transactions are more likely to 
fail than high value transactions. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer ~f Proprietary 
Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (R. Dreyfuss, H. First & D. Zimmerman 
eds., 200 I). 
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In one survey, 19% reported that their most recent request for materials was 
denied, 11 and many reported that, in the past two years, failure to receive requested 
materials led to significant delays and even to abandonment of projects. Scientists 
are far more likely to encounter obstacles in their efforts to gain access to materials 
and unpublished data than they are to encounter patent enforcement. 
Two papers in this volume review and analyze these findings. 12 Wesley Cohen 
and John Walsh, who carried out some of the most prominent of the underlying 
studies, explain the difference between patents, on one hand, and materials or data, 
on the other hand, largely in cost-benefit terms, citing the relative ease of excluding 
competitors from access to research inputs that cannot be readily replicated by 
other researchers and the relative costliness of tracking down patent infringers and 
suing them.13 Nonetheless, they find evidence of a sharing norm that retains some 
vitality in the willingness of most researchers to share data and materials with their 
competitors even when it is costly for them to do so. 14 Observing higher rates of 
withholding materials in their own data than in an earlier study, 15 they suggest an 
explanation for the apparent decline in sharing that has nothing to do with commer-
cial practices: perhaps higher levels of NIH funding are to blame, because they 
make. exclusionary practices more advantageous as scientists compete more 
vigorously for larger grants. 16 At the same time, they see exclusionary practices as 
having positive incentive effects on the scientists who develop the resources 
and worry that NIH policies designed to compel sharing might dampen scientific 
progress by limiting these incentives. 17 
Katherine Strandburg reviews the same studies and offers a somewhat different 
explanation. 18 Strandburg sees the emergence of an 'ignoring patents' norm 
alongside the traditional sharing norm in science. 19 Noting more problems with 
the transfer of tangible materials, she suggests that the costs of sharing tangible 
materials make it more difficult to enforce a sharing norm for these resources.20 
11 Walsh, Cohen & Cho, View from the Bench, n. 7 above, at 2002. 
12 Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Access-or not-in Academic Biomedical Research, Chapter 
I in this volume (hereinafter Cohen & Walsh chapter); Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing 
qf Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, Chapter 4 in this volume (hereinafter Strandburg 
chapter). 
13 Cohen & Walsh chapter, n. 12 above, at 25-33, 36. 
14 Ibid. at 34-7. Costs of sharing include the risk oflosing future priority of discovery to a competitor 
as well as the immediate tangible costs of duplicating and providing materials. Ibid. at 31. 
15 Cohen & Walsh, Real Impediments, n. 7 above, at 15. 
16 Ibid. at 20. 
17 Cohen & Walsh chapter, n. 12 above, at 38. 
18 Strandburg chapter, n. 12 above; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community 
Norms at the Boundary Between Academic and Industrial Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id= 1413229> (hereinafter 
Strandburg, Community Norms). 
19 Ibid. at 118-20, Strandburg chapter, n. 12 above, at 2. 
20 Ibid. at 17-20. 
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Her normative story rests on an account of the preferences of academic scientists as 
rational actors, including a preference to learn the results of the collective research 
project.21 In contrast to Cohen and Walsh, she assumes that researchers would be 
adequately motivated to invest in tool development by their need for tools to use in 
their own research, even without the benefits of exclusivity, and that increased 
sharing would therefore be unequivocally good for science.22 She therefore pro-
poses mechanisms to promote the sharing of research materials and to reduce the 
private payoffs of exclusivity. 
The cost-benefit account and the norms account are not entirely distinct. Costs 
and benefits lurk behind norms, and norms factor into the costs and benefits 
of actions that violate or conform to those norms. In the end, the most striking 
differences between Cohen & Walsh on one hand and Strandburg on the other 
reside not in their explanations of the data but in their assumptions on matters that 
the data do not illuminate. Nonetheless, the two accounts have somewhat different 
implications for understanding the role of transaction costs and the potential for an 
anticommons arising in the exchange ofresearch tools. 
I. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit account offers a straightforward explanation for the observation 
that exchanges of materials are more likely to give rise to research-impeding trans-
action costs and bargaining breakdowns than exchanges driven by patent rights. 
As a matter of law, a user needs to get permission from the patent owner before 
using a patented invention. But as a matter of practice, both owners and infringers 
routinely ignore patents in the context of upstream research. Would-be users thus 
readily gain access to patented technology without having to engage first in costly 
bargaining, a fact that minimizes the risk of an anticommons arising from a prolif-
eration of patents alone. 
Cohen and Walsh distinguish patent rights from what they call 'practical 
excludability.'23 With or without a patent, a scientist or institution may control 
access to a resource, such as a large private database or a transgenic mouse. Those 
in control of such a resource hold the practical power to force other users to enter 
into an agreement before they will share it. Sometimes practical excludability and 
21 Strandburg argues that 'the pervasiveness of the disregard for patents, its justification in normative 
terms ... the distinction between using a tool in research and "making a profit," the use of reputational 
and shunning penalties to enforce forbearance and sharing, and the involvement of community organi-
zations and high-status members as "norm entrepreneurs" in promoting it suggest that the "ignore 
research tool patents" is a positive social norm enforced within the community of academic and indus-
trial researchers.' Ibid. at 121. 
22 Ibid. at I I, 19. 
23 Cohen & Walsh, Real Impediments, n. 7 above. 
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patent protection may both be present, as in the case of patented transgenic mice. 24 
But sometimes users have the capacity to duplicate patented inventions in their own 
laboratories without the cooperation of the patent owner,25 and sometimes users 
need the cooperation of owners before they can gain access to unpatented materials 
and data. 
Practical excludability has three notable attributes. First, for practical exclud-
ability to exist, the resource must be costly for users to recreate on their own. 
If users are able to duplicate the resource at reasonable cost in their own labora-
tories, they may not even become aware of purely legal obstacles such as patents. 
Strandburg explains that it may be more costly for users to duplicate materials 
because the materials embody considerable tacit knowledge about how to produce 
them or because of the importance of standardization for the research. 26 The same 
may be true of new methods or data. If it is costly for users to recreate the resource, 
it may also be costly for the owner to provide it, 27 although this is not a necessary 
feature of practical excludability. The costliness of sharing may make owners less 
willing to share; on the other hand, owners may be able to exchange the practically 
excludable resource for value that helps defray its costs.28 As long as it is cheaper 
for the owner to share the resource than it is for the user to recreate it, there are 
potential gains from exchange that stand to be dissipated through transaction costs 
or lost through bargaining breakdowns. 
Second, practical excludability requires that the owner be able to exclude users 
from the resource at low cost. This is an important distinction between patents and 
practical excludability. Enforcement of a patent is a high cost endeavor; failure to 
share materials and data may require little or no effort on the part of the owner. 
Exclusion becomes more costly if the owner needs to share the resource to secure 
24 David Mowery and Arvids Ziedonis have examined Materials Transfer Agreements (MT As) at the 
University of Michigan and found that they are often complements to patents rather than substitutes for 
patents. David C. Mowery & ArvidsZ. Ziedonis,Academic Patents and Materials Transfer Agreements: 
Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECHNOL. TRANSFER 157 (2007). 
25 It is tempting to speculate that the patent law requirement for an enabling disclosure of how to 
make and use the invention, 35 U .S.C. § 112, forces inventors to codify their inventions and thereby puts 
researchers in possession of the invention without the need for further consultation with the inventor. 
But it seems from the studies reviewed herein that many researchers are infringing patents that they are 
not aware of, suggesting that they are learning how to make and use these inventions from sources other 
than patent disclosures. 
26 Strandburg chapter, n. 12 above, at 17. 
27 It may consume costly materials and the time of skilled laboratory personnel to reproduce tangible 
materials and to ship them off, or to train the user to produce the materials independently. See ibid. at 
20-29. Even in the case of data, it may be costly for the owner to provide access in a form that is readily 
usable by others or to explain how to use a database. Moreover, as Cohen and Walsh elaborate, sharing 
a resource with competitors may deprive the owner of a competitive advantage in future research, at the 
cost of losing future priority of discovery and attendant future rewards. Cohen & Walsh, Real 
Impediments, n. 7 above, at4-7. 
28 Payment may take many forms, including cash, acknowledgement in publications, collaboration 
on future research, or license rights to future discoveries. 
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patents or other rewards, or to avoid reputational penalties. When it is cheap for 
owners to exclude users, exclusion is more likely. 
Third, when it is costly for users to create the resource on their own, and cheap 
for owners to exclude users, the burden of inertia rests on the user to overcome 
transaction costs before proceeding with the use. This is another important distinc-
tion between patents and practical excludability. If a patent is the only obstacle to 
use ofa technology, the burden ofinertia rests on the patent owner to detect and stop 
the infringing activity, generally after it is under way. The patent owner has a legal 
remedy, but this remedy is not self-executing. Infringement litigation is costly and 
fraught with risks. The cost and risk may seem worthwhile if market exclusivity in 
a lucrative product is at stake, but if the user is an academic researcher who is not 
close to developing a commercial product, the owner may conclude that the costs 
of enforcement do not justify the potential gains. The higher the costs of enforce-
ment, the less likely enforcement becomes. In this environment, researchers may 
feel that it is generally safe to proceed without a license, even when they are aware 
of the patents. 
Compare the position of a researcher who wishes to use a tangible research tool 
that she cannot readily duplicate in her own laboratory. Ifit is cost-prohibitive to 
duplicate the tool, the burden of inertia rests on the user to persuade the party in 
control to agree to share it before proceeding with the use. The owner doesn't have 
to bring an infringement action in order to force researchers to pay, but can sit back 
and wait for users to seek access and then bargain over terms. The tool may or may 
not be covered by a patent, and the researcher who seeks access may or may not be 
aware of the patent ifit exists. The obstacle that academic researchers take note of 
is not likely to be a patent, but a restriction on access to something that is costly to 
duplicate without a license. The need for ex ante cooperation from the owner 
requires the researcher to incur transaction costs before proceeding in a way that the 
remote future possibility of infringement liability does not. 
This highlights an interesting dimension to the anti commons problem that Heller 
and Eisenberg did not address: the burden of inertia matters in predicting the likeli-
hood of use in the presence of significant transaction costs. When the burden of 
inertia to clear rights in advance is on users-as it is when researchers seek access 
to materials or data from someone else-high transaction costs work to the detri-
ment of users, creating a risk of underuse. The user must incur these costs before 
using the resource, and if the transaction costs exceed the expected value of the use, 
it likely will not happen. But when the burden of inertia to enforce rights against 
infringers after the fact is on owners-as it is when users infringe patents-high 
transaction costs work to the detriment of owners, mitigating the risk of underuse. 
The more costly it is to enforce patents, the less likely it is that owners will go to the 
trouble, making it less risky for users to proceed without first bargaining for a 
license. 
Of course, this dichotomous account of the burden ofinertia is a simplified story 
that may not capture the nuances of every potential transaction. One can imagine 
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circumstances in which the party whom I have pictured as free of the burden of 
inertia-the unlicensed user in the case of patents or the owner of the resource in the 
case of practical excludability-is motivated to seek out a deal rather than to leave 
it up to the other party to make the first move. A patent infringer may fear legal 
liability and want to secure a license before proceeding further with R&D, even 
though the patent owner is so far unaware of the infringing activity or willing to 
ignore it for now. As for material transfers, some owners may affirmatively wantto 
disseminate their materials for profit and be motivated to seek out potential users as 
customers, incurring transaction costs along the way rather than leaving the burden 
of inertia on would-be users. Moreover, the burden of inertia may shift as the situ-
ation unfolds. If the patent owner takes action to enforce the patent, the infringer 
may need to incur significant costs to respond. Even if the user makes the first 
move, an owner of materials who wants to enter into a lucrative transfer will need 
to incur transaction costs in order to get to that point. But despite the plausibility of 
these alternative scenarios, the recurring observation in multiple studies that nego-
tiations over transfer of materials are more likely to block research than patents 
suggests that the simplified account holds true much of the time. The result is, on 
one hand, to mitigate the risk of an anticommons arising from a proliferation 
of patents alone and, on the other hand, to aggravate the risk of an anti commons 
arising from a proliferation of resources that are characterized by practical 
excludability. 
For purposes of refining the anti commons hypothesis, what matters is that high 
transaction costs to clear property rights do not necessarily lead to inefficient under-
use. Not every property right is like a padlock on a door that cannot be opened 
without first tracking down the owner and negotiating to get the key. Some property 
regimes put the burden on the owner to identify and pursue those who have gained 
access without permission. In such a regime, the costlier it is to enforce property 
rights, the less likely it is that enforcement will occur, and the safer it is to proceed 
without a license. 
The burden of inertia may provide an adjustable mechanism for shifting the 
balance between ex ante incentives for innovation and downstream risks of an anti-
commons without changing the underlying property rights. Where the burden of 
inertia lies may appear at first to be mere happenstance-a fortuitous consequence 
of the cost ofreplicating a particular resource, or an inadvertent byproduct of the 
costs of enforcing legal rights in a society that cares about due process. But the 
burden ofinertia can sometimes be adjusted as a design feature of property regimes. 
Legal proceedings may be elaborate or simple. Burdens of proof may be placed on 
plaintiffs or on defendants. The sheriff may lend owners a hand or leave them to 
fend for themselves. 
Consider the case of patents. As noted, ordinarily the burden of inertia to enforce 
patents rests on patent owners. But in the case of patented drugs, Congress has 
shifted some of that burden from owners to infringers. Under the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, sometimes known as the 
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Hatch-Waxman Act,29 patent owners who seek to exclude generic competitors 
from the market are not limited to the slow and costly process of seeking a judicial 
remedy for infringement, but may use their patents to defer FDA approval of a 
generic version of a patented drug.30 The statute requires the manufacturer of a 
generic version of a previously approved drug to certify to the FDA that its product 
does not infringe any valid patents, even ifit otherwise meets the FDA's standards 
for approval. 31 If the generic manufacturer challenges the patent, the owner may file 
a lawsuit to establish that the patent is valid and infringed. But the owner need not 
await a judicial remedy to get relief. While the lawsuit is pending, and without 
evaluating its merits, the FDA will enter an automatic 30-month stay of approval of 
the generic product.32 The net effect is similar to a preliminary injunction against 
the generic product, but without the usual burden on the patent owner to demon-
strate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a balance of hardships 
in its favor, and impact on the public interest.33 Although this enhanced benefit to 
patent owners gains leverage from a legal regime outside the patent system, it is 
hardly an inadvertent byproduct of FDA regulation. The statute explicitly directs 
FDA to consider patent protection and the status ofinfringement litigation in deter-
mining the effective date of product approval. 34 The result is a significant shift in 
the burden of inertia away from the patent owner. 
A similar shift in the burden of inertia has occurred between copyright owners 
and creators of academic coursepacks as a consequence of judicial decisions hold-
ing commercial copy centers liable for making and selling photocopies of copy-
righted materials for classroom use.35 Although the copyright statute explicitly 
permits fair use of a copyrighted work, including 'reproduction in copies ... for 
purposes such as ... teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),' 36 the 
courts have held that a for-profit copy center that makes such copies for sale to 
students is not entitled to claim fair use. 37 Fearing liability for infringement, many 
copy centers thereafter began requiring that professors obtain licenses to reproduce 
all copyrighted works before they would make copies of coursepacks. The result 
29 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered provisions of 15 U.S.C., 28 
U.S.C., and35 U.S.C.) (hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act). 
30 15 u.s.c. §§ 355 (b), (c), G). 
31 15 u.s.c. § 355 G). 
32 See, eg, Apote.x, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that Hatch-Waxman 
Act does not require FDA to review patents for validity and infringement). 
33 See, eg, Sanoji-Synthelabo v. Apote.x, 470 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reciting standards for 
preliminary injunction). 
34 15 u.s.c. §§ 355 (b), (c), G). 
35 See Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F .3d 1381 ( 6th Cir. 1996). 
36 17U.S.C.§107. 
37 99F.3dat 1389. 
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has been a dramatic shift in the burden of inertia from copyright owners onto 
professors who use their works in teaching materials. 38 
If policymakers were so inclined, they could find ways of shifting the burden of 
inertia from the owners of patents on research tools onto infringers of those patents. 
The studies reviewed herein suggest that academic researchers often get away with 
patent infringement, 39 and those who fear that patents could otherwise impede aca-
demic research might consider that a good thing. But suppose one believed, as 
Cohen & Walsh tentatively suggest,40 that the lack of practical excludability 
prevents owners of research tool patents from receiving adequate compensation 
for their innovations from the researchers who use them.41 One might try to lighten 
the burden of inertia on patent owners by making it easier for them to get prelimin-
ary injunctions against unauthorized use of their inventions in research. Or, one 
might borrow the power of federal research sponsors over grantees to facilitate 
enforcement by patent owners, much as Congress has borrowed the power ofFDA 
over drugs to reduce the burden on owners of drug patents.42 Research sponsors 
might, for example, require grantees to promise to exercise due diligence to avoid 
patent infringement, or to affirm that the work for which they seek funding will not 
infringe patents. They might also retain the right to suspend grant funding for patent 
infringers. 
Of course, such a shift in the burden of inertia could aggravate the risk of an 
anticommons developing. If policymakers are more worried about creating an anti-
commons than they are about fortifying upstream R&D incentives, they might have 
quite the opposite impulse. Rather than making it cheaper to enforce patents, they 
might make it more costly. In fact, federal funding agencies have shown little polit-
ical inclination to strengthen the hand of patent owners against their own grantees. 
Quite the contrary, NIH has instead used its influence as research sponsor to reduce 
transaction costs that impede access to proprietary research tools and to minimize 
the impact of patents on academic research.43 After the Court of Appeals for the 
38 See, eg, Stanford University Libraries, Copyright & Fair Use, available at <http://fairuse. 
stanford.edu/Copyright_and_Fair_Use_Overview/chapter7/7-a.html>; University of Texas, Fair Use 
of Copyrighted Materials, available at <http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/lntellectualproperty/ 
COPYPOL2.HTM>. 
39 Seenn. 7-11 above and accompanying text. 
40 Seen. 17 above and accompanying text. 
41 For a defense of the importance of providing effective protection for research tool patents, see 
lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgAA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part). See also Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing that 
exemptions from infringement liability should be narrowly construed). 
42 See nn. 29-34 above and accompanying text. 
43 See, eg, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Nat') Inst. Of Health, Principles and Guidelines for 
Recipients ofNIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research 
Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72090 (Dec. 23, 1999); Memorandum ofUnderstanding Between 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. and Public Health Service (July I, 1999), available at <http://www.ott. 
nih.gov/pdfs/oncomouse.pdt> and Memorandum of Understanding Between DuPont Pharmaceuticals 
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Federal Circuit squarely held that nonprofit research in universities is not categoric-
ally exempt from infringement liability,44 the National Academies of Science put a 
research exemption from patent infringement on its legislative agenda for patent 
law reform. 45 
Given the reported infrequency of patent enforcement against universities and 
academic researchers, it is interesting that the scientific community remains con-
cerned about this issue.46 Perhaps the institutional perspective of universities is 
different than the individual perspective ofresearchers as revealed in the reported 
studies.47 Universities may feel little confidence that past patterns ofnonenforce-
ment of patents will continue indefinitely. Public universities appear for now to 
enjoy sovereign immunity from patent infringement actions,48 but there are signs 
that the Supreme Court may be retreating from its prior robust concept of 
state sovereign immunity.49 Patent infringement exposes both researchers and 
and Public Health Service (July 1998), available at <http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/cre-lox.pdf>; Dep'tof 
Health & Human Serv., Nat'! Inst. Of Health, Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: 
Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 18413 (April 11, 2005). 
The Supreme Court extended further protection from infringement liability for upstream research 
with its decision in Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005), broadly construing a statutory exemption 
from infringement liability to cover industry-sponsored research in a university laboratory on a patented 
molecule. The statutory exemption was added as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, n. 29 above, to permit 
clinical testing of generic versions of patented drugs during the patent term to facilitate prompt market 
entry thereafter, but the statutory language provides more broadly: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into 
the United States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission 
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ... 
Hatch-Waxman Act§ 202, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 27l(e)(l). The statutory basis for the exemption 
was not that the research occurred in a university setting, but rather that it was related to the development 
and submission of information to the FDA, a condition that commercial research can more easily satisfy 
than academic research. 545 U.S. at 202,206. 
44 Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
45 STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE2lsTCENTURY 82 (2004). 
46 See Association of American Universities et al., Comments on H.R. 1908 and S. 1145, The Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 (2007) at 5, available at <http://www.nacua.org/documents/PatentReformAct_ 
Comments.pdf>. 
47 Studies of the impact of intellectual property on research scientists have relied heavily on surveys 
of working scientists rather than professionals engaged in technology transfer or freedom to operate. 
It is possible that these professionals know more than scientists about costs imposed on universities in 
dealing with demand letters from patent owners, for example. 
48 See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 
666 (1999). 
49 For the robust version of sovereign immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996); 
Florida Prepaid v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bankv. Fla Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). For a critique of these decisions in the context of patent 
infringement by universities and a suggestion that the federal government should condition receipt of 
federal research funds on a waiver of sovereign immunity for patent infringement, see Jennifer Poise, 
Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for Patent Infringement after Florida Prepaid and 
College Savings Bank, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 507 (2001). For recent evidence of possible retreat from the 
robust version of sovereign immunity, see Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v.Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (hold-
ing that Congress has authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases). The Supreme 
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institutions to risks of liability, but academic institutions have endowments that 
might make them more attractive targets of enforcement than individuals, and they 
may better appreciate the magnitude of the liability risk. Universities are generally 
risk-averse institutions, and they may find it challenging even to evaluate risks of 
patent infringement liability. Liability risks, as well as freedom to operate costs, 
increase with the numberofrelevantpatents, which might tempt risk-averse institu-
tions to curtail research in areas characterized by extensive patents. But traditions 
of academic freedom make it difficult for university administrators to control the 
behavior of scientists in order to control liability risks. Perhaps a research exemption 
that eliminates the risk seems like a good way out of this bind. 
II. Sharing Norms 
Katherine Strandburg offers a norms-based account of the lack of enforcement of 
patents in academic research. 50 According to this account, the research community 
has responded to a proliferation of patents in upstream research by adapting its 
traditional norms, which in the past called for sharing and not patenting, to permit 
patenting but also to call for ignoring patents in the context ofuniversity research. 51 
She finds evidence that norms play a role in the dissemination ofresearch tools in 
the efforts of prestigious scientific institutions, such as the National Academies of 
Science52 and the National Institutes ofHealth,53 to encourage sharing and to pre-
serve freedom to operate for the scientific community, especially in the context of 
biomedical research. Empirical evidence suggests that universities have sought to 
abide by the guidelines established by these institutions in licensing their own 
patents.54 
Court recently sought the views of the solicitor general on a petition for certiorari in a case that could call 
into question the scope of state sovereign immunity in the patent law context. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. 
v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2076, 170 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2008) (inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States in a patent infringement action brought against the California 
Department of Health Services that was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds), decision below at 
Biomedical Patent Mgmt. v. Cal/fomia, 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
50 See Strandburg, Community Norms, n. 18 above. 
51 Ibid. at 114. 
52 See, eg, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FINDING THE PATH: ISSUES OF ACCESS TO RESEARCH 
RESOURCES (1999); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND 
MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES (2003); NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEAL TH (2006). 
53 Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and 
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 24090 (Dec. 23, 1999), available at 
<http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdt>, NIH Data Sharing Policy and Implementation Guidance 
(Mar. 5, 2003), available at <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_sharing_guidance. 
htm>. 
54 Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical 
Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2006). See also White Paper, In the Public Interest: Nine Points 
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One difficulty with this account is that it is not obvious as a normative matter why 
the scientific community would embrace an 'ignore patents' norm that is more 
robust than its sharing norms for materials and data. 55 Strandburg suggests that it is 
more challenging for the scientific community to maintain sharing norms for these 
resources because it is more costly to share them and because there are greater 
benefits to be gained by not sharing. 56 Cohen and Walsh see evidence ofa possible 
sharing norm for materials in the fact that, despite the costs of sharing and the 
benefits of not sharing, most requests for materials and data are fulfilled. 57 It is pos-
sible that patents lurk behind some instances of failure to share materials, and that 
withholding of patented materials pending completion of a materials transfer agree-
ment functions as a low-cost means of enforcing rights to these inventions against 
academic researchers. 58 Further empirical work might help to illuminate what the 
relevant norms are, how they are enforced, and how much work they do. 
The norms account has some explanatory power in understanding counterex-
amples in which patents have actually been enforced. To the extent that nonen-
forcement of patents depends on the operation of social norms, one might expect 
that those norms would be more effective among members of a close-knit, homo-
geneous community who share those norms and who interact with each other 
enough to anticipate reciprocal claims and feel vulnerable to reputational conse-
quences if they depart from the norms.59 Such community members know that in 
the next round the positions of owner and user may be reversed, making owners 
more likely to treat users as they would hope to be treated themselves. Conversely, 
one might expect less compliance with norms by outsiders or fringe members of the 
community who have fewer concerns about reputation and reciprocity. 
This may help explain the limited traction of the 'ignore patents' norm in the 
context of genetically altered mice.60 One firm, duPont, obtained dominant patent 
to Consider in Licensing University Technology (March 6 2007) (hortatory statement signed on behalf 
of nine research universities and the American Association of Medical Colleges encouraging univer-
sities to license inventions in accordance with normative principles), available at <http://news-service. 
stanford.edu/news/2007 /march7 /gifs/whitepaper.pdf>. 
55 Perhaps the relevant normative distinction has less to do with sharing than with norms and 
traditions of free inquiry, particularly in academic research, which is where all scientists begin their 
careers. Hauling researchers into court to get them to stop their experiments may feel like an aggressive 
violation of their right of free inquiry, while failing to send off a transgenic mouse may seem more like 
failing to make a charitable contribution. 
56 Strandburg chapter, n. 12 above, at I 7-19. 
57 Cohen & Walsh, Real Impediments, n. 7 above, at 18. 
58 In their study of materials transfer agreements at the University of Michigan, David Mowery and 
Arvids Ziedonis, find that the use of materials transfer agreements often precedes the filing of a patent 
application and increases the likelihood that the university will patent the invention. David C. Mowery 
& Arvids Z. Ziedonis, n. 24 above, at 167. 
59 Strandburg, Community Norms n. 18 above, at 41. 
60 In a series of papers Fiona Murray has described the impact of patenting on the dissemination of 
the oncomouse and the response of the scientific conununity to licensing terms offered byduPont. Fiona 
Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared: Resistance and Accommodation to Patenting in Academic 
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rights as the exclusive licensee of Harvard University on both oncomice (ie, mice 
that have been genetically engineered to be susceptible to cancer) and ere-lox tech-
nology for creating 'knockout' mice (ie, mice in which certain genes are deleted in 
specific tissues). Oncomice and knockout mice are both important research tools. 
DuPont offered the mice to researchers on terms that provoked outrage in the aca-
demic community, including a prohibition on any further sharing or breeding of the 
mice, annual disclosure to duPont of research results, and a grant-back to duPont of 
rights in any future discoveries arising from use of the mice.61 Some scientists 
responded by willfully ignoring the patent while creating their own mice and lob-
bying their universities to refuse to sign the duPont agreement. 62 Mouse geneticists 
discussed strategic responses at scientific meetings, and the National Academy of 
Sciences held a workshop and published a report on the topic. 63 The Director of the 
National Institutes of Health became personally involved in negotiations with 
duPont. 64 After four years ofhigh-level negotiations, duPont and NIH finally signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding that permitted academic scientists to use 
oncomice without cost for noncommercial purposes, but did not permit them to 
transfer the mice to scientists at other institutions without using a duPont MT A, nor 
to use them in industry-sponsored research.65 These restrictions have proven to be 
an ongoing source of problems between duPont and the scientific community, even 
years after the NIH Memorandum of Understanding. 66 
Controversy over the licensing of these patents is sometimes presented as a clash 
between corporate and academic cultures.67 But few corporate-academic interac-
tions in biomedical research have been as protracted and difficult as this one. Perhaps 
duPont, whose core business is chemistry ,68 was less concerned about the traditional 
sharing norms ofbiomedical research than firms from the biopharmaceutical industry 
Science (Working Paper 2006), available at <http://web.mit.edu/fmurray/www/papersffHE%20 
ONCOMOUSE%20THAT%20ROARED_FINAL.pdf> (hereinafter Murray, The Oncomouse That 
Roared); Fiona Murray, Patenting life: How the On co mouse Patent Changed the Lives of Mice & Men 
(Working Paper 2007), available at <http://www.bus.wisc.edu/insite/events/seminars/documents/ 
Oncomouse_Chapter_Short_09242007.doc> (hereinafter Murray, Mice and Men). 
61 Murray, Mice & Men, n. 60 above, at 25. 
62 Ibid. at 27. 
63 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING LABORATORY RESOURCES: GENETICALLY ALTERED 
MICE (1994). 
64 Murray, Mice & Men, n. 60 above, at 3 I. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Eliot Marshall, DuPont Ups Ante on Use of Harvard's OncoMouse, 296 SCIENCE 1212 (2002); 
Sam Jaffe, Ongoing Battle Over Transgenic Mice, 18(14) THE SCIENTIST 46 (2004); Sasha Blaug, 
Colleen Chien, & Michael J. Shuster, Managing Innovation: University-Industry Partnerships and the 
licensing of the Harvard Mouse, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761 (2004). 
67 See Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared, n. 60 above, at I ('The Oncomouse is a prominent 
example of the increasingly common collision between two institutions-academic and commercial 
science.'). 
68 Fora history ofR&D at DuPont, see DAVID A. HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLY SMITH, JR., SCIENCE AND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY: DUPONT R&D 1902-1980 (1988). 
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that had more pervasive interactions with academic biomedical scientists. If the 
'ignore patents' norm is more effective within the biomedical research community 
than it is between community members and nonmembers, the community may have 
reason to be concerned about the future. As biomedical research draws increasingly 
on research in other fields, such as information technology69 and nanotechnology, 70 
researchers may find themselves at greater risk of trespassing upon patents held by 
institutions outside the biomedical research community who feel less constrained 
to observe the community's sharing norms. 
Community norms might also be ineffective at deterring infringement actions 
against universities by disgruntled faculty members. We have already seen an 
example in the case of Madey v. Duke.71 Patents have so far played a relatively 
small role in intra-academic disputes, but the patent infringement claim is the one 
that worked for Professor Matley, and it would not be surprising to see other 
unhappy professors play that card in the future. Although typically universities own 
the patents on inventions made by faculty, faculty members sometimes obtain 
patents on inventions that universities have elected not to pursue.72 If the faculty 
member later leaves the institution under unhappy circumstances, that patent may 
be a valuable weapon in any ensuing legal dispute. 73 In the context of such disputes, 
aggrieved faculty members could be motivated to pursue a winning legal theory 
even though it is not cost-justified and violates traditional norms. 
To the extent that the scientific community relies on sharing norms to forestall 
anticommons problems, one might wonder about the durability of those norms 
looking forward. Fiona Murray and Scott Stem have suggested that the impact of 
intellectual property on the scientific community may shift over time as legal rules 
69 See NIH, Recommendations of the Biomedical Information Science & Technology Initiative 
Implementation Group (2000), available at <http://www.bisti.nih.gov/bisti_recommendations.cfm>. 
10 See Kelly Y. Kim, Research Training and Academic Disciplines at the Convergence of 
Nanotechnology and Biomedicine in the United States, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 359--<il (2007); 
NIH Bioengineering Consortium, Nanoscience and Nanotechnology: Shaping Biomedical Research 
June 2000 Symposium Report, available at <http://www.becon.nih.gov/nanotechsympreport.pdf> 
(visited July 30, 2008). 
71 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Professor Matley owned patents on laboratory equipment that he 
used to perform research at Duke University. After his relationship with Duke unraveled and Duke 
replaced him as principal investigator on a grant, Professor Matley sued on a variety of legal theories, 
including patent infringement. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords & Shields, 299 SCIENCE 
1018-19 (2003). 
72 !fa university that is receiving federal funding does not elect to retain title to an invention, US law 
provides that 'the Federal agency may consider and after consultation with the [university] grant requests 
for retention of rights by the inventor.' 35 U.S.C. § 202(d). 
73 Although Professor Madey's lawsuit remains unusual, a front-page article in the Wall Street 
Journal in 2006 projected more legal disputes between universities and faculty in the future as univer-
sities become more business-like in their management ofresearch on campus, intervening more in deci-
sions about research rather than deferring to faculty autonomy. Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Ivory Power: 
Once Collegial, Research Schools Now Mean Business-Arizona State Strips Professor of Empire as 
Funding Ebbs; Lawsuit Claims Retaliation-A Price on Lab Space, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2006, at Al. 
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and social norms interact. 74 In the past decade the biomedical research community 
has taken numerous measures to fortify its sharing norms in the face of perceived 
incursions of conflicting incentives to protect and enforce intellectual property. 75 
These measures have had some success in influencing the behavior of universities 
as licensors of patents, 76 but they have been less successful in influencing the 
behavior of scientists as providers of research materials and data. If anything, it 
appears that restrictions on dissemination of these 'practically excludable' resources 
are becoming more common over time, 77 suggesting that sharing norms may be 
weakening. 
If there is indeed an 'ignore patents' norm within the scientific community that 
serves to forestall potential anticommons problems arising from a proliferation of 
patents in biomedical research, it might make sense to adjust the patent laws to 
reflect that norm rather than relying upon noncompliance and nonenforcement 
under the current law. Widespread disregard of patent laws in respectable institu-
tions like universities threatens to engender disrespect for the patent laws, to the 
detriment of patent owners. If you live in a community in which patent infringe-
ment is pervasive, practiced on a regular basis by all of your competitors and 
collaborators, when the occasional outlier (such as duPont) decides to enforce a 
patent, the patent laws seem arbitrary and unfair.78 If the proliferation of patent 
rights has led to widespread patent infringement by academic scientists, it is worth 
considering whether patent owners would be better served by a patent system that 
drew boundaries that prestigious institutions, such as universities, could respect 
and abide by. 
74 Fiona Murray & Scott Stem, Learning to Live with Patents: Assessing the Dynamic Adaptation to 
the Law by the Scientific Community (Working Paper 2008), available at <http://imio.haas.berkeley. 
edu/WilliamsonSeminar/murray04 l 708.pdf>. 
75 See, eg, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Nat'! Inst. Of Health, Principles and Guidelines for 
Recipients ofNIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research 
Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72090 (Dec. 23, 1999); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ( 1997); BOARD ON LIFE 
SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS: 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES (2003); California Institute of Technology et al., 
In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology (March 6, 2007), 
available at <http://www.aau.edu/research/TechTransfer_Pts_to_Consider.pdf>. 
76 See Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical 
Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3 I, at 32, 38-39 (2006). 
77 See Cohen & Walsh, Real Impediments, n. 7 above, at 118 (comparing their results to those of 
earlier studies). 
78 An obvious parallel is the widespread disregard of the copyright laws by young music listeners. 
Sporadic enforcement efforts by the recording industry have been largely ineffective, and have failed to 
arrest the decline in respect for the copyright laws. See Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and 
Norms qf File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577 (2006). Perhaps copyright owners would be better 
served by a narrower set of rights that were more widely respected. Cf. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms 
and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey the Copyright Laws, 
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006) ( describing norms against copying that are widely respected within 
the jamband community). 
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III. Conclusion 
Over the past decade, empirical studies have investigated whether a growing 
number of intellectual property claims have caused a tragedy of the anti commons 
in biomedical research. Surveys of scientists suggest that it is rare for an ongoing 
project to be stopped because of patents. Within the academy, scientists generally 
ignore patents and rarely face patent enforcement. Perhaps this reflects the continu-
ing vitality of sharing norms in academic science, or perhaps patent owners 
conclude that enforcement of patents against academic researchers is not worth the 
cost. On the other hand, scientists report more problems in gaining access to 'practi-
cally excludable' resources such as tangible materials and data that they cannot 
readily duplicate in their own laboratories. 
These results point to an important qualification of the anticommons hypothesis. 
As framed by Heller & Eisenberg, the risk of underuse in an anticommons arises 
when too many property rights lead to excessive transaction costs and risks of bar-
gaining failures. But bargaining and transaction costs do not always precede the use 
ofresources that are protected as property. Sometimes, as in the case of patents, the 
burden of inertia is on the owner of the property right to detect violations of its 
rights and sue for infringement. In this context high transaction costs make enforce-
ment less likely, and unauthorized use more likely, mitigating the risk of an anti-
commons. On the other hand, when it is easy for owners to exclude users from 
access to resources, as in the case of'practically excludable' materials and data, the 
burden of inertia is on users to persuade owners to permit access, whether or not the 
resource is covered by formal property rights such as patents. In this context high 
transaction costs make use less likely, aggravating the riskofan anti commons. The 
burden of inertia might sometimes be adjusted in the design oflegal rules, offering 
another mechanism for calibrating the balance between the costs and benefits of 
property rights. 
